Prof. Goetz Briefs
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And what will you talk about, the relation between? Well, I do not know what I'm going to talk about. That's good. I have a diary on the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and a second page of our very reverend Father Abba Prior here. and I think something will come up in my mind. Now, I told Fr. Claude this morning a little story, which has the privilege of being a true story. I had published some time, many years ago, in 1921, a little book in Herder Company in Freiburg, and there I had discussed the problem, why is it that a number of acts in the market would appear to us today as utterly bearable, whereas St.
[01:07]
Thomas and Plato and Aristotle would have conducted them outright as endangering the koinonia, as Aristotle and Plato said, the communitas, or St. Thomas Comunitas Cristiana. Now then, I discussed a particular phenomenon which I called a sub-marginal ethos. And I was quite surprised about the effect of this little chapter in the book. So one day a southern German industrialist, whom I met while skiing on the Feldberg, dropped in and said to me, look here, I can give you a wonderful example of this sub-marginal ethos out of my own experience.
[02:14]
We are here in Wiesenthal in southern Germany, 21 firms producing staple cotton goods. Very strong competition, prices were unregenerative, and nobody could invest any money in this business. But after a number of years, we observed that one of us began to enlarge his plant to buy new machinery and to show all those outward signs of growing prosperity. I said, now wait a minute, how is this possible? This fellow hasn't married a rich woman, he has still the old woman. This fellow has got no particular bank credits, nor he hasn't won in the lottery. Where did he get the money? So there was a great deal of guessing around. Well, did this man get the money to invest here?
[03:16]
And how does it come about that there's the nerve to invest in a business which apparently is just freaking even the best? And they found out the following thing. They found out that this man put 47 times roof and wall into the square centimeter of textile product and sold it at the common 48th roof and wall. Originally, in this particular industry, there was a standard measure, 48 times root and root. Search, search, and search, and search, and search, per square centimeter. And this fellow had found a trick to sell 47 times roof and board, you know, as 48 goods. And of course, on thousands and thousands of square yards, the savings of these two sets, both ways, you know, brought him a lot of money.
[04:21]
Then this industrialist said to me, you know what we did? I said, I'm really curious what you did. He said, we did the same. I said to him, well, of course after a few years, the market was just where it had been before. Oh yes, this fellow was the 46th. I said, what did you do? I went to 46th, and sold the 46th good as 48th good. And I said, that must have ended somewhere, because after all there must be some movement walks in the street. And then it ended 44, and then we made a monopoly, joined the Catholic. Now this is a very nice story illustrating the point I want to bring home. You see there's a certain virtue which you might call honesty in business.
[05:25]
That is, if you sell a good as such and such quality good, then you expect to have the same effects desired with this picture. Now, if there's somebody who cuts the margin, you know, by leaving one thread out, or by deteriorating the quality a little bit, you know, I'm reducing the quantity, the package, a little bit, you know. I call him a sub-marginal businessman. That is, a businessman whose ethics, his ethos, pattern is sub-marginal. Those who remain in the line of the 48 standard, I call marginal because they follow the accepted line. And those who do better and give the public a better commodity, the same standard type, I call them intramarginal representatives of intramarginal ethics.
[06:31]
Now, this is the beginning of the story, and I'm sure you will understand when I use the terms submarginal ethics, intramarginal ethics, and marginal ethics. What does that mean? Now, if you look at the whole path from St. Thomas down from Plato and Aristotle to St. Thomas up to, let's say, the Spanish great scholastics, you find a profound concern with the problem of justice in so-called business life. There's the fact that they all speak of Equivalence, that is, datum et acceptum, in exchange must be of the same value. That what is given, that what is taken, must be value equal. And Thomas tries to show that when all is said and done, labo et expense, that is, the labor cost and other cost, determine the justice of the price.
[07:39]
Aristotle, we find the same story. And whenever, and now in the relatively simple medieval world, where everybody knew what things cost in the way of labor and expenses, where every shoemaker knew what were his cost and therefore what were the cost of the next shoemaker, and so all along the line. where there was no capital risk involved, you know, because there was practically almost no capital entailed except a few tools. There everybody was perfectly clear what labor expenses meant. Labor expenses meant work costs, you know, how much work is in crystallizing a particular pair of shoes, and the cost of the leather and what have you. Well, then we observe the same, of course, story with Aristotle, where he makes the distinction between the thematistic care, market values, you know, and our economia, which is simply household management.
[08:55]
And from the 16th century on there comes a change, and we see that people like Thomas de Mercado, the Spanish, call us Dominican, in 1565, published a book, a Summa de Tratos de Contratos, that is a summa on contracts and agreements, you know, in Spanish. That was the first time that one of the scholastics saw it in vernacular. Why did he do it? He explained that this book is a primer for merchants. A Primarch for Merchants not dealing with Spanish business or inter-Christian business, but dealing with the ethics of merchants, dealing in the pagan world, in the colonial world. That is Thomas de Maca, no one among the many Carthaginians of the time, Baroque ethics, if you like.
[09:57]
We found out that there are certain phenomena in trade and commerce and merchandising that do not fit into the traditional pattern of ethics in business. And he sits down at the request of merchants from Seville and sits down and explains to them how they should behave, how they may behave, When they deal with the non-Christian orbit, when they deal with the Indians, you know, in America, too bad, don't talk about other East Indians, you know. There's a different pattern of ethics advised, and it doesn't make any sense now to come with love or an expenditure in overseas trade, dealing in these faraway countries where just Christian ethics have no institutional framework and have no tradition. And where merchants from Holland and merchants from Spain and traders from England fight tooth and nail to get the better of everybody else.
[11:08]
So he writes this, and he asks the question, now what has happened here? In the case of Thomas Mercado, who is typical for a whole period, 16th, 17th century, what has happened here? These baroque scholars, moral theologians, begin to define not the type of life in business which leads to the perfection and sanctity of the businessman himself. But he tried to show the marginal ethics a Christian merchant businessman may feel too without falling into mortal sin. Without falling into mortal sin. This is the point. Something had to be done.
[12:11]
And we see the slow evolution of this line already in Louridanus and in Echidius Lassinus. Antonin, to a certain extent, you know, 14th, 15th century. And then comes this onrush in the late Spanish moral theology, where there's a profound concern about the soul of the merchant, the businessman, the trader, you know, the investor. How far can he go without losing his soul? Where his formal empathy had always been, you know, to teach him, you know, the perfecciovite mercatoriae, you know, the perfecciovite mercatoriae. Now they said, how far can you go? Just a fine line store, marginal ethics. These moral theologians teach marginal ethics, and they teach even what appears, compared with the prevailing ethos in European Christian orbit countries, they teach a sub-marginal ethos.
[13:24]
You can go to that point without falling into mortal sin. There begins now this great orientation of physics towards the minor level, also in other spheres, not only economically, politically. I have the same story since Machiavelli. You see how the thing is gliding down. You get into a situation where a sort of an ethos entropy curse makes itself felt. Ethos entropy means simply that the ethos patterns, the prevailing ethics in business, political, and so on, begins to slide down, have a trend of sliding down. and establish themselves on an ever lower basis. Now, he says, yes, yes, ever lower basis. And now, of course, the church, the Moral Theology Church observes these things. That has been, yet after all, Christians more.
[14:25]
I mean, the Latin countries, Spain, Portugal, and to a minor extent Italy, were involved in this whole business, you know, and the church had failed there. Something has to be done. It doesn't make any sense to speak here now of usuria, you know, and of justum praetium, you know, what is the justum praetium? What is usuria under such conditions, you know? And the Scholastic, the later Scholastic trial now, done with Merriam's, Brigham's Artists, you know, Rookum, Cessans, done deferred payments, you know, and all these things, as explanations of the rate of interest which is morally allowed. This is the most interesting thing, you know, changes to this whole thing basically. So if you ask me how do I have to change what are external forces that bring the change around, I would like to say a few words about them because they are so little known about the great overwhelming fact that occurred since the 16th century.
[15:39]
The European people, the Christian orbit, had been a sort of peninsula. The bigger part of it was north of the Mediterranean and Then by 1453, the Levantine path was more or less lost, Africa was lost anyway, so the Christian orbit was shrinking, in particular since 1453. Now, then in 1492, Christopher of Colombo discovered a new continent. And then came Vasco, before it was Gaso da Gama, then the Spaniards in South America, Pizarro, Cortes. It was an entirely brand new continent, the northern part of which was straightly unsettled. Canada, United States, down to Mexico, Rio Grande, straightly unsettled. South America was heavily overrun, Australia was quite unsettled.
[16:41]
What has happened here was that never happened in the history of mankind to the extent that we know about it, that suddenly the small peninsula of Europe acquires two tremendous empty continents. Now they were oppressed before in Europe. The mainland ratio was continuously declining. The precious metal man ratio was declining. That is, what was the opting for Europe was a decline, economic decline. And that very moment there comes this discovery of the two continents. And the two continents brought gold and silver. They brought products unknown before, costly, and what's much more important, tobacco, you know, and mice, and all sorts of things, you know. And suddenly, the European man, who up to that time had lived in a man-land ratio of 1 to 14, found himself confronted with a man-land ratio of 1 to 500 acres.
[17:52]
And to a precious metal man ratio? I don't know exactly what figures that say, but it was 1 to 3 before it was 1 to 50 now. Then comes this tremendous upswing in European business. Shipping, transportation, insurance comes up, production increases, prices go up, of course, on account of the silver inflation. And there's suddenly a tremendous change in this whole affair. At a time when the Reformation had broken out, when anyway the transition, the traditional standards of ethics were already shaky on account of the Calvinistic, not the Lutheran, the Calvinistic Reformation in Holland, England, Scotland, and France. And these things came together, and of course there had been the influence of the Renaissance, ensured a total change in the world outlook.
[19:01]
In these colonial lands, those people held the upper hand, who were not burdened and inhibited by old ethical standards. And the same holds true for the nations that fought for the possession of his colonial lands. So they began to develop entirely new political and economic ethical standards in this newly conquered world. The merchants, the businessmen, the financiers, the slave traders, investors, And because everybody began to adhere to these new standards, which had in a way, showed in a way, a certain parallelism to the libre examen, to the free interpretation of the Bible after the Reformation. And that was the situation which the Church in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and other Latin countries envisaged.
[20:12]
And that caused what Scholzinger called the rise of Baroque ethics. Baroque ethics meaning that particular type of ethics which looked out for the just bearable acceptable minimum standards of ethical behavior in order not to lose the soul of this newly rising mergers business and some trading classes. Now, it had always been a characteristic of the, up to that time, characteristic of the thought, political and economic thought, that you must not allow any policy and any pattern of behavior that is dangerous to the established community, the koinonia, as we play to say, communitas, in terms of centaurs and scholastics.
[21:15]
And therefore, You find in Aristotle's Politeia, in Blunt's Politeia, in the Nomoi, you find in Aristotle's, of course, Politeia, you find the same concern always against the merchant, the businessman. Keep him tight, keep him tight. Because this is the danger, the merchants, the businessmen, the traders are in danger because they deal with money and maximi ad lucrum tendant, as St. Thomas burned it down in a few words. Mercaturis maximi ad lucrum tendant. And so, therefore, you must establish firm rules to keep them out. After all, Plato's Polytheia is only the attempt to show the Athens of his period, the corrupt and democratic and business ethics of his period, a model city in which the merchant force can glow.
[22:21]
And so, though, as a means of keeping lovers to have iron money so that the boy cannot fall Now, there was this 2,000 years development, and suddenly came the onrush of this new behavior pattern, and there we were. There is that particular sociological shift, which the scholastics as well explained as, let's say, try to avoid the shift towards the businessman, towards the trader, that came the great outstanding political and economic fact in connection with the discovery of the two brand-new continents. Now, let us look at that
[23:23]
a rough pattern that developed in this newly opened world. Well, of course, it was a world in where the traditional standards didn't hold. The pioneers came here of all sorts. The pirates came to colonize the chartered companies. Everybody wanted to get rich quickly, get out of it for possible. Therefore, there was no institutional framework that kept the behavior patterns in line. Everybody could go with a sub-marginal strategy as far as he could, unless somebody came and shot him, you know, or hanged him, you know. That would happen too, I think, at least. Now, what is now the pattern? The pattern is very clear. The individual operating in these newly conquered lands outside of the Christian orbit is the type of a self-determining personality.
[24:30]
He is that, and because he is that, he is also the one that is self-liable. If he engages in practices which do not bear out as he tried, as you know, The illugger is his. If he makes 500,000% profit, it's also his. Nobody else is his. That is, he is liable himself for his actions. No guilt, no corporation picks him up or backs him up when he fails. What else? The third part of the pattern is that he is inspired by a very keen sense of robust self-interest to the extent of selfishness. And, of course, that he is continuously in conflict with his like, who want to do the same thing that he has accomplished. This is the pattern that develops in this colonial world.
[25:37]
individual self-determination, the businessmen, self-liability, motivating forces, self-interest, if not selfishness, and competition among others. 16th, 17th century, 18th century. Now this thing had no philosophy back of it, no, absolutely no. It just happened, that was all there was. It was a new environment, these things just happened. But we observe in the 17th century, 18th century in particular, that a number of Dutch businessmen and traders and investors, and English businessmen and traders, begin to write little pamphlets. And what do they say in the little pamphlets? They say, well, you know, our European policies are all wrong. All wrong. The real thing to do is to let the business world follow its own course. Let the businessman do what he likes, what he thinks is profitable for him.
[26:39]
Everybody benefits from it. So there comes Thomas Mann in England. there comes uh... what was the name of his big friends uh... uh... Godard Godard I think was his name there comes uh... John Lennon, Josiah Childs and uh... Jeremy Tucker a whole bunch of writers who say why is it an interesting thing why doesn't the government why doesn't the church allow us to follow our own interests you know and it would prove that everybody's better But it had no philology back of it. And then came Adam Smith, and he said, this thing has a philology back of it. The philology has had its religious basis in deism. Now deism, I suppose I have to explain a little bit, is a sort of a pseudo-theology which came up a father which was a certain Herbert of Shelbury, who after these long religious wars in the 17th, 16th, and 17th centuries said, now every educated man is perfectly clear that this cannot go on, that we bust each other's heads on account of religious dogmas and formulas.
[27:57]
Let's be plain and simple now. Everybody believes in God. All right? Everybody believes in God. Now that's a second. Everybody believes that God made man. Everybody believes that. All right. He did that to make man happy. Everybody wants man happy. All right. So what? So we are perfectly sweet. We can do without a church. We can do without sacraments. We can do without dogmas, you know. Perfectly clear. God has created the world and man. He wants man to be happy. So he ordained man, preordained man in such a fashion that man following his interests becomes not only happy himself, but makes everybody happy. Aaron Smith and Voltaire, of course, and all the educated people of the 18th century were these, and believed precisely what I said. Aaron Smith looked at this thing, and he found in his days
[29:03]
basis, the ground for an economic philosophy, which, summed up in a few words, is this. The government, the churches, should keep out of economic affairs, and of social affairs, and of course of political affairs too. No business in there. So there should be no ecclesiastical courts concerning justice of prices and judiciary and whatnot. Out it goes. That's number one, a negative standpoint. The positive standpoint is, it should be recognized that nature, deus viva natura, that God, our nature, wants man to be happy on Earth. In order to make him happy, He gave him certain interests, and impulses, and instincts. Following these interests, instincts, and impulses, man makes not only himself happy, everybody is happy. I was very much impressed with this, in parenthesis, with the spirit of everybody's happiness.
[30:07]
In my neighborhood, in Chivichills, there lives a very fine gentleman with a very fine woman. And we used to go there, dancing parties and so on and so on. It was very lush and very nice and very charming. And suddenly we heard nothing of him. Two years later, I met him in the Philippines. He said, Mr. So-and-so, what happened to you? Oh, he said, you know, my wife divorced me and married my friend. And I divorced, no, this is my friend, he divorced his wife and I married his wife. So everybody's happy. So when I hear the phrase of everybody's happy, you know, I always... Now then, Joseph Smith did it better. It wasn't me. But you know what people like of natural rights. The natural rights type of enlightenment period. nature, or the supreme being, as he says, interchangeably, he never sees God, or the invisible hand, you can sort of, you can understand it, call it the covidentiel, invisible hand, things are arranged in such a fashion that if everybody follows his interest, he realizes without knowing the best for everybody.
[31:36]
That's the basic philosophy. Therefore, economic liberalism. Now, of course, he was, I would say, he was a humanist enough do not to go to any lengths, he found certain flaws, and to feel when you read his two books, The Theory of Moral Sentiment of 1759 and The Well-Being of Nations of 1776, you feel that this Scotsman, you know, had certain inhibitions, you know, he was too much of a humanist to draw all the brutal consequences. the second generation did, and there came up what we call Manchester economics, you know, the utter unsophisticated belief that brutal interest is the thing, and nature or God, if they exist, at least the latter one, you know, has ordained the world in such a fashion as my interest, the rest doesn't count.
[32:38]
And therefore you get, during the 19th century, these very evil social consequences of this natural system of economic liberty. And you see where it came from. It was the reverberation of that ethos pattern that had formed itself outside the Christian orbit in the struggle for its true confidence. began to hit back now on those nations who were most engaged in colonizing and had the freest, the largest freedom from the medieval tradition, Calvinistic Calvinism, you know, and they went headlong ahead and built up their colonial empires and got a better part of what could be earned and gave them for 300 years. There is an ethos pattern that already was formed in this colonial outside of Christian orbit land, so it begins to become the standard pattern of the Christian orbit too.
[33:53]
That occurs in the 19th century. That occurs in the 19th century. what we got in the 19th century with this ascendancy of this marginal and sub-marginal ethos pattern was the tremendous social evils of the early decades and generations of the economic of capitalism in the 19th century, out of which grew Marxism, which is best known today in the form of Marxism, A lot of it drew to the German movement, a lot of other movements. That is, in this Western world, there was still a protest left that came from the medieval tradition and from the classical tradition.
[35:02]
In the Western world, there was, where I left, there was left a vague idea, if not among the businessmen, and perhaps not among the philosophers, there was left among the people a vague idea that there must be justice in the world, di chaos in the world. There must be a telos in the world, there must be meaning. in the world, or in the world of business. And business must have something to do with the good of all, not always the good of an individual. there must be also a hierarchy, an order, a hierarchical order, perhaps, which puts things into shape. Things cannot be run along the line of individual self-interest and mere competition.
[36:10]
And then we see this, the ethics of justice coming up. Let me take the time to change Jung's farm bureau. business. What is begged of them, Mr. Klemmer, for just wages, for fair prices and fair profits, for decent prices of agriculture, and so on and so forth. That is, the formation of such associations, unions, cartels, trade associations, farm bureaus, means In this world of competition and selfishness, self-interest, there's for us only one way to get our share, get the justice for us, this is organization. That is, here breaks through in this so-called pluralism of associative organizations of the kind I mentioned, breaks through the idea of justice.
[37:14]
But since they are organized along the line of their own group interests, it is the justice for us. not the justice for the koinonia, for the communitas, the justice for our group. And then comes this, in particular, this pluralism of organized forces spreads ever wider, becomes ever more powerful. There comes the interpretation of justice for us as far as our organized power reaches. That is, it is no longer the concern of a justice defined in terms of the sum tripli of the equivalents. It is defined in terms of how far as our organized power can reach.
[38:20]
Therefore here, power and justice become equivalent. This is the great, tremendous danger of our times, that without our knowing it, the original perfectly justified pressure for justice to be acquired to be guaranteed by our organization, just as far as our group, you know? That is, in an underhand fashion, changes into justice reached as far as our power reached. Now, if you look now at the had the picture itself that a society built up suddenly no longer on individuals, they're dismissed, and that was so, and these people had been dead in the 19th century, but built them on organizations, farm bureaus, trade associations, work associations, and so on, medical professional organizations.
[39:41]
If you look at this world, and you ask yourself, what is The idea, the pattern of ethos is to follow, to find out that it's the same pattern that has developed in the transoceanic world. Only apply it now to the group. There is group self-determination, group self-interest, group self-reliability, group competition. That's the pattern. I speak of this organized type of society of our time as the secondary saints of liberalism, economic liberalism, because it's just the same behavior pattern, only now carried by, developed by the group. The final point is this, that these groups now, following this behavior pattern, see in their government power the surest, promptest, safest means to put their demands across. will begin to infiltrate the government and to raise continuous demands against the government.
[40:46]
To give you an example, there's a Senator Proxmire in Wisconsin who took the seat of Senator McCarthy, I think, and served the last three, four months of McCarthy's time, coming up for an election. I have read, as a matter of fact, a congressman gave me a mimeographic report on the demands on the bills which Senator Boxmeier has dropped into the hopper of the Congress. In four months, Senator Boxmeier, who is coming back for the election now, has dropped into the hopper bills to a tune of $24 billion. workers, farmers, businessmen, all the people around, you know, was buying, trying to buy their vote, you know. You'll find that in some cases the bills coming up are written not by a congressman nor by the government.
[41:52]
Bills are written, prepared, fully in shape, you know, by an outside organization, farmers, whatever it be, outside organization, to make it a congress. The congress often doesn't take it. What is visible here is the fact that democracy has lost its strength. The first type of democracy in Europe was a democracy of what I call metaphysical foundation. That is, the 1291 democracy in Switzerland began, the constitution of Switzerland began with the name of the most holy trinity. The Irish constitution of 19-something, the name of the most holy trinity. The Dutch, the English constitution, the United States constitution. That is, democracy really was based on certain fundamentals of a religious nature. Now, of course, the enlightened mind of the 19th century couldn't stand this religious foundation, that was all monkey business, and tried to build up the democratic philosophy, doctrine, on a rationalist basis, utilitarian and rationalist basis.
[43:06]
Of course, it didn't work. The next thing that happened is that democracy today is only put The foundation is only expediency, a purely instrumentalism, pragmatism. We are in the era of pragmatics, the third phase of democratic evolution, pragmatism. Look at John Dewey about this point, pragmatism. And this pragmatic democracy of our time that has no foundation in metaphysics, theology, or in rational grounds, you know, becomes a mere becomes open for the introduction of the pluralistic forces which all societies build today. You get this confused situation which we have. Allied governments are, in a way, sick governments. You see the wealthiest state makes itself a sort of Santa Claus by giving all powerful groups what they want, running after them, paying here, paying there, paying there, paying there.
[44:15]
But of course, that goes very well as long as you have an anonymous group that pays the price. The so-called taxpayer pays, and the taxpayer pays in particular through inflation. And then of course the taxpayer that pays through inflation is the man that doesn't notice that they're being paid, you know? When your costs of living and cars and so on go up, you know, because the dollar is being inflated, you know. You do not even know it's robbing you, but of course you are paying taxes. in this way by being robbed of your dollar value. That is, in this development which we have, there is a trend towards inflation, a so-called secular trend towards inflation. In that secular trend towards inflation, there develops the fiscal state to increasing strength. The state, some way or other, has to pay to get the money for fulfilling all these welfare tasks that are burdened on it, and so the fiscal state grows.
[45:19]
It is while the welfare state shows to people the benevolent features of Santa Claus, the fiscal state comments, now you pay the industrial tax. While the welfare state loses in the way of dignity and sovereignty, the fiscal state gains back. And there lies the great danger for our situation, that we are confronted with a very strong secular inflationary trend, which can be stopped only by ever-increasing power of the fiscal state. Since we cannot allow a nation to run into a perfect chaos in the long run, into a permanent inflation of its monetary units, you know, we have to do something about it, that is, people have been doing something about it, and we know what they have been doing.
[46:28]
You see, this is my last one, this whole affair, how originally this whole problem of justice, of Ardo, Axis as Aristotle calls it, The problem of our doing justice was slowly put to the side. Believe in the free-playing process of economic competition, self-interest, and so on and so forth. But then, in an attempt to bring some more justice to operate and to put things again in shape, we get this justice for us, which, as this thing develops, becomes a justice for us as Sada power reaches. And then comes the turn towards the pragmatic state, where the justice for us works out in the power of the government on our behalf. It is the consequence I have mentioned before.
[47:33]
I would like to say that we are in a clear transition. in which period it becomes again an urgent need to redefine the line between justice and power that we have to build. in all probability have to fall back again on the natural law philosophy as Walter Lippmann has already done, as hundreds of professors of law are doing today, Catholics and non-Catholics, falling back today, to find again a foot on the same ground. And unless we find that foot on the same ground, that type of man whom Jacob Borchardt called the simplificateur terrible, will come over us and do it for us. Thank you. I think that was so provocative this thing that we have to have a little discussion tomorrow.
[48:39]
You stay all day. And no, we leave tomorrow because we have to go back to Kindergarten. It's a small class, it's going to test us. Now then, we have to cut the brick with that. Yeah, directors. It's mass to see Amitabh Maharaj. Nine o'clock, perhaps after breakfast. Between breakfast and sex. Breakfast and sex, there's a period. Can't you drop the sex? I think that we don't do the welfare state that favour. It's a Pixar play. Yeah, why don't we do that? Thank you.
[49:44]
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